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L ARGUMENT 
Mr. Pearson contends this appeal "remains centered on a single question: who is an 
Assistant Police Chief." See Pearson Response Brf, p. 4. The City's position in this 
appeal centers on two questions: (1) whether the pre-2004 version or post-2004 version of 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 applies to Mr. Pearson's employment, and (2) if the post-
2004 version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 applies, whether under that version Mr. 
Pearson is an at-will or merit employee.1 
A. CONTRACTUAL ISSUES ARE NOT PART OF THIS APPEAL. 
Mr. Pearson argues that when he was hired, the City's actions including his offer 
letter from the City, led him to believe he was not at-will.2 See Pearson Response Brf, 
pp. 10-13. He also argues that despite the 2004 amendments, a municipality may still 
remove employees from at-will status if it wishes to do so. Id. at pp. 29-31 (citing Kivett 
v. Marion County Sheriff s Pep 1 2007 WL 906470 (S.D. Ind. 2007)). These arguments 
are irrelevant since they go to Mr. Pearson's claim, still pending in district court, that he 
was not an at-will employee based on the City's conduct, actions, statements, and/or the 
1
 Individuals who are "merit" employees of a governmental entity have a "property 
interest" in their employment, which means they cannot be deprived of that employment 
without due process. See, e.g., Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789. 793-94 (10th Cir. 1988). 
2Mr. Pearson also objects to the City's pointing out that he admitted that he was 
aware when he was hired that all police officers were at will under the version of § 10-3-
1105 at that time. See Pearson's Response Brf., pp. 10-13. However, that is a correct 
assessment of the statutory issue. His other statements, as cited in his brief, did not go to 
the statutory issue and went instead to his implied/express contract claims. 
1 
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letter from the City offering him employment. Express/implied contract issues are not 
part of this appeal, which deals only with whether Mr. Pearson's employment was at-will 
pursuant to a statute, i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. There is a distinction between 
whether a governmental employee is at-will based on a state statute, as opposed to 
whether a governmental employee is at-will based on an implied or express contract.3 
B. APPLYING POST-2004 UTAH CODE ANN, § 10-3-1105 TO MR. 
PEARSON REQUIRES THAT THE STATUTE BE RETROACTIVE, AND 
THAT CONCLUSION IS UNSUPPORTED. 
Mr. Pearson contends the post-2004 version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 can 
be applied to his employment because the relevant date is the date of his termination and 
not the date of his hiring. See Pearson's Response Brf., p. 5. This argument fails. 
1. Mr. Pearson's Cited Cases Do Not Assist His Case. 
In making this argument, Mr. Pearson cites numerous cases. Those cases prove 
only that what is significant is whether a new or amended statute impairs vested rights 
and imposes new obligations on one of the parties. This goes to what the parties' rights 
and obligations were at the time of hiring, not the time of termination. 
Mr. Pearson first contends "'[a] statute is not made retroactive merely because it 
draws on antecedent facts for its operation.'" Id. (quoting Cox v. Hart. 260 U.S. 427. 435 
3If a municipal employee is not at-will based on express/implied contract the due 
process procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann. $ 10-3-1106 may not apply because that 
section deals with employees who are not at-will based on statute, i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105. However, that is not an issue that must be decided in this appeal. 
? 
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(1922)). Cox does not apply to the facts here. That case deals with a statute involving 
access to desert lands. Id. at 430. In 1908 Congress passed a law that restricted and 
limited the right of entry and assignment of the desert land law so as to authorize an 
extension of time in which to make proof of ownership. Id. The statute included a 
proviso excluding from its operation anyone who had performed certain acts/procedures 
prior to the statute's enactment. Id. The conflict arose when two parties disputed which 
one owned a particular tract of land. Id. at 432. One party argued that the other party was 
not entitled to the land because that would mean the statute would be applied 
retroactively, which would be improper. Id. The Court disagreed that retroactivity was a 
concern, noting that the effect of the proviso was to exclude from the statute's operation 
those whose rights had arisen under a prior law. Id. The Court then commented that a 
proviso such as this: 
does not give the proviso a retroactive operation. The language in terms 
applies to one who at the time of the enactment occupied a particular status, 
viz. the status of a person who has done the things enumerated. A statute is 
not made retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its 
operation. 
Id. (emphasis in original). Explaining further, the Court commented that "[t]he proviso so 
construed impairs no vested right and brings into existence no new obligation which 
affects any private interest." Id. 
Mr. Pearson's situation is inapposite. In order for Cox to assist Mr. Pearson, there 
would have to be a legislative comment in post-2004 § 10-3-1105 that would permit 
3 
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retroactive application, since the post-2004 statute does impair the City's vested right to 
treat Mr. Pearson as at-will, and also would impose new due process obligations on the 
City where it previously had none. 
Second, to support his position that the relevant time to consider is that of 
termination, and not hiring, Mr. Pearson cites Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad 
Co., 2004 UT 80, 104 P.3d 1185, and contends common sense is used to determine 
"'whether the new provision attaches new consequences to events completed before its 
enactment. "' Pearson's Response Brf., p. 6 (quoting Goebel, 2004 UT 80. ^ f39 (emphasis 
added)). However, the amendment in Goebel was procedural,4 which is not the situation 
here. The only import of Goebel here is that it's discussion shows the ban on retroactive 
application applies when an amendment would "enlarge, eliminate, or destroy" vested 
rights: 
AGoebel involved notice of claim provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act 
("GIA"). Goebel, 2004 UT 80. If 36. Goebel was injured February 19, 1998, at which 
time GIA stated a notice of claim should be delivered and directed within one year of the 
date of the injury to the political entity's "governing body." Id. ]J 37. Salt Lake City was 
the political entity. Id. ^ 36. The statute was amended effective August 11, 1998, to 
require that notice of claim be directed and delivered to the city or town recorder when 
the claim was against an incorporated city or town. Id. ^ 37. Goebel submitted his notice 
of claim after August 11, 1998, by delivering it to the mayor and members of the Salt 
Lake City Council. Id. Salt Lake City moved for dismissal on grounds that Goebel failed 
to comply with the notice of claim, and the trial court dismissed the lawsuit. Id. ^ J 36. 
Goebel appealed, arguing that his injury had occurred before the amendment, and that to 
apply the amended statute would mean "improper retroactive application of law." Id. \ 
38. The Court found no error because the amendment was procedural. Id. ^ 40. 
4 
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A statute is not to be applied retroactively unless the statute expressly 
declares that it operates retroactively.... This rule applies only with 
respect to substantive laws, however; statutes that do not "enlarge, 
eliminate, or destroy" substantive rights can be applied retroactively. 
Convenience, reasonableness, and justice are factors we consider in 
deciding whether a statute has a merely remedial or procedural purpose.... 
When analyzing whether a statute as amended "would have retroactive 
effects inconsistent with the usual rule that legislation is deemed to be 
prospective," we should use "a common sense, functional judgment about 
'whether the provision attaches new legal consequences to events 
completed before its enactment.' This judgment should be informed and 
guided by 'familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and 
settled expectations.'" 
Goebel, 2004 UT 80, ^39 (internal and external citations omitted). 
Third, Mr. Pearson sites two cases to contend Utah's appellate courts "have 
recognized that causes of action accruing after the enactment and effective date of 
statutes are not retroactive," including "those which affect current employment rights." 
See Pearson's Response Brf, p. 6 (citing Soriano v. Graul, 2008 UT App 188. 186 P.3d 
960; Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1979)). These cases are inapposite. 
Soriano deals with the Utah Health Case Malpractice Act and a 2004 amendment. 
Soriano, 2008 UT App 188, | 8. This Court agreed with Soriano's plaintiff/appellee that 
the legislature intended the amendment be applied retroactively even though it did not use 
the term "retroactive," since the amendment's language specifically stated it applied to all 
arbitration agreements signed "after May 2, 1999." Id. The statute's legislative history 
also showed that legislators had discussed retroactivity. Id. ^ 9. Soriano is not the 
:> 
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situation here, since the post-2004 amendment neither implies nor states it will apply 
retroactively. Nor does the legislative history5 here say anything about retroactive 
application, including that tapes of the Committee hearings do not mention retroactive 
application.6 
Campbell also fails to support Mr. Pearson's position. That case involved a car 
accident, and one issue was the interest rate to be applied to the jury's special damages 
finding. Campbell, 596P.2dat 1042. The accident occurred September 9, 1973, and the 
defendant argued that to allow the 8% interest rate would allow retroactive application of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44, which became effective May 13, 1975, and which was the 
source for the 8% interest. Id. The Court disagreed, noting the statute stated that interest 
was to be added "to the amount of damages found by the jury or the court" so that the 
statute was not operating retroactively because it clearly applied to judgments entered 
after its effective date. Id. The Court also observed the statute stated that the date to 
begin adding interest was the "date of the occurrence of the act." Id. This is not the 
5The City has reviewed the legislative history for the 2004 amendments to Utah 
Code Ann. $ 10-3-1105 (Senate Bill 23). The written history of SB 23 and some of the 
oral legislative discussion is available online. Tapes of the oral discussion in Committee 
can be reviewed at the State Archives located in the Rio Grande Railroad Station in 
downtown Salt Lake City. Discussion on these tapes sometimes is difficult to hear. 
6The amendment at issue here amends both Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and § 10-
3-1106. Some of § 10-3-1106 clearly is procedural, such as the required composition of a 
municipality's appeals hearing board/committee. In fact, the composition of that board 
provided much of the impetus for amendment, since smaller municipalities did not have 
sufficient employees to comply with pre-2004 § 10-3-1106Ts requirements. See infra, 
discussion in Part D. 
6 
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situation here, where the legislature did not state the amendment was to apply to police 
officers already employed as of its effective date. 
Fourth, Mr. Pearson cites In re Anthony, 267 P. 789 (Utah 1928),7 as a 
"particularly telling example" of a case where a statute was not retroactive. This 
argument makes no sense here, and furthermore is not applicable because the City does 
not contend post-2004 § 10-3-1105 should be applied retroactively. In fact, the City 
contends it cannot be applied retroactively because it impairs the City's vested rights, and 
neither contains an express provision as to retroactive application nor is it procedural. 
Other cases cited by Mr. Pearson to support his argument actually support the 
City's position. For example, in Retired City Civilian Employees Club v. City of Omaha 
Employees' Retirement System, 260 N.W. 2d 472 (1977), city employees who had retired 
prior to a city ordinance's amendment in 1972 argued they were entitled to pension 
benefits, which had been nonexistent prior to the ordinance's passage. Id. at 474. The 
Anthony involved a fireman who began working for the Salt Lake City Fire 
Department in 1908 and was injured in 1919. Anthony, 267 P. at 789. He received 
workers' compensation benefits from 1919 to August 1, 1925, which was the statutory 
limit on number of years at that time. Id. He applied for re-employment with the fire 
department in 1925, and his application was refused on grounds he was physically unfit 
for duty due to the 1919 accident. Id. The statute in effect in 1919 had stated that a 
pension would be paid to a fireman only if that fireman had 20 years of active service and 
attained 60 years of age, and that anyone injured who was outside those parameters would 
receive benefits in accord with the "Workmen's Compensation Act." Id. The fireman 
later applied for a pension under an amendment to the statute which became effective 
May 10, 1927. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's denial of 
the fireman's pension application, noting the 1927 amendment could not be applied 
retroactively in light of the definition of "paid fireman" contained therein. Id. 
7 
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court disagreed, noting the ordinance did not apply retroactively "unless that intent is 
clearly expressed." Id. Another of Mr. Pearson's cited cases, Specialty Restaurants 
Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d393 (Colo. 2101) {en banc), dealt with an amendment to the 
Colorado Workers' Compensation Act, and whether changes to the lump sum amount for 
a partial total disability could be applied "retroactively . . . on transactions that have 
already occurred or on rights and obligations that existed before its effective date." Id. at 
399. The court held the amendment was procedural. Id. at 400-02. The court 
commented: ";[a] statute is retrospective if it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired 
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new 
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.'" Id. at 399 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). This is significant since it is what Mr. Pearson 
proposes when he argues post-2004 § 10-3-1105 should apply, i.e., that even though he 
was hired under one statute, the City was required to accept new obligations, lose vested 
rights, and accept new duties when the statute was amended even though this gives him 
more rights than he previously had. 
Finally, Mr. Pearson's cited case, Dolese Bros. Co. v. State of Oklahoma, 64 P.3d 
1093 (Okla. 2003), does not assist his position. Dolese dealt with whether amendments to 
tax statutes should be applied retroactively as the State Tax Commission had done. Id. at 
1096-97. The appellate court found the tax commission erred in applying amendments 
and, significantly, stated that "if there is any doubt, it must be resolved against 
8 
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retroactivity." Id. at 1097. Likewise, should this Court have any doubt, it should be 
"resolved against retroactivity" of post-2004 § 10-3-1105. 
2. The Relevant Time is the Time of Hiring. 
Although Mr. Pearson contends that in this case the relevant time to apply a statute 
is at the time of "injury" and not at the time of hiring, he provides nothing to support this. 
By contrast, the City's initial brief provides support that the relevant time to determine 
employment rights is the time of hiring. See City's Init. Brf., p. 4, citing Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564. 577-78 (1972) (employment rights "created and defined" 
by "terms of his employment"); Randall v. Buena Vista County Hosp., 75 F. Supp.2d 946, 
955-56 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (due process requires "legitimate claim of entitlement to 
continued employment"); Trivoli v. Multnomah County Rural Fire Dep % 703 P.2d285. 
287 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (requirement of reasonable expectation of tenure "at the time he 
was hired"). This is further supported by case law dealing with whether a public 
employee has a "property interest" in employment, since due process applies only when a 
public employee has a property interest in continued employment and, if the employee 
does not, the employee is at-will at hiring. See, e.g., Kingsfordv. Salt Lake City Sch. 
Dist.9 247 F.3d 1123. 1129n.2 (10th Cir. 2001) (property interest arises only when 
employee has "legitimate claim of entitlement" to "continued public employment"; 
refusing to apply substantive amendment retroactively); Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789. 
9 
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793-94 (10th Cir. 1988) (assessing whether property interest arose at time of hiring since 
employee otherwise is at-will). 
3. The Intention is That Amendments Are Substantive. 
There is no merit to Mr. Pearson's argument that the City did not have a vested 
right as of 2004 to view Mr. Pearson as at-will because "'[w]hen the legislature amends a 
statute, it intend[s] the amendment to change existing legal rights.'" Pearson's Response 
Brf., pp. 7-8 {quoting Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956P.2d257 (Utah 1998)5 and 
citing Visitor Info. Ctr. v. Customer Serv. Div., Utah State Tax. Comm'n, 930 P.2d 1196 
(Utah 1997)). In fact, Mr. Pearson misapprehends the meaning of the quoted language, 
which actually supports the City's position because it reflects that amendments are 
presumed to be substantive, and substantive amendments cannot be applied retroactively. 
For example, the context of the language quoted by Mr. Pearson is as follows: 
A long standing rule of statutory construction is that we do not apply 
retroactively legislative enactments that alter substantive law or affect 
vested rights unless the legislature has clearly expressed that intention. 
Section 68-3-3 of the Code embodies this rule: "No part of these revised 
statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." . . . We also presume 
that when the legislature amends a statute, it intended the amendment "to 
change existing legal rights." 
Olsen, 956 P.2d at 261 (some internal & external citations omitted) (quoting Visitor Info., 
930P.2dat 196 (citation omitted)). This language clearly supports that the amendments 
at issue here were presumed to be substantive, and that they did change the City's 
existing, vested rights. 
10 
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Furthermore, it is unavailing for Mr. Pearson to attempt to equate the Utah 
Minimum Wage Act to what clearly are substantive amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 10-
3-1105. Indeed, the sections and rule that he cites specifically state exactly when a 
minimum wage will begin to apply. See Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-103(2Va) ("After July 
1,1990, the commission may by rule establish the minimum wage or wages . . . . " ) ; Utah 
RAdmin.P. 610-1-3 ("All employers employing workers in the state of Utah . . . shall pay 
the established minimum wages of. . . $7.25 an hour for all hours employed effective July 
24, 2009."). This does not amount to retroactive application as shown in Soriano. See 
supra, discussion in Part 1(B)(1). 
Finally, Mr. Pearson acknowledges that some portions of Senate Bill 23 ("SB 23"), 
which is the source of the amendments to both post-2004 $ 10-3-1105 and post-2004 § 
10-3-1106. are procedural. He argues, however, that "[interpreting the bill as not 
intending to benefit the rights of existing employees is not consistent with the legislative 
history." Pearson's Response Brf., p. 9. However, Mr. Pearson does not show exactly 
where in the legislative history the substantive provisions at issue here were intended to 
be retroactively applied. Certainly, there is nothing in the legislative history to reflect Mr. 
Pearson's argument, including tape-recorded Committee hearings. 
4. The Legislature Did Not Indicate Post-2004 § 10-3-1105 Would Apply 
to Officers Already Employed as of SB 23 fs Effective Date. 
Mr. Pearson argues that the 2004 amendments to Utah Code Ann. $ 10-3-1105 can 
be compared to minimum wage laws, so that "a person employed at the time the 
11 
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legislation is enacted would not be entitled to the benefits of the Minimum Wage Act 
because neither the statute nor the rules mention retroactive application." Pearson's 
Response Brf, p. 9. This is incorrect, since both Utah Code Ann. $ 34-40-103(2)(a) and 
Utah RAdmin.P. 610-1-3 give a specific date after which a specific minimum wage must 
be paid. This is in stark contrast to the 2004 amendment to § 10-3-1105, which neither 
gives a date nor states that it is to be applied retroactively to police officers already 
employed as of its effective date. The City and this Court can only assume that this was 
intentional, and also assume that Mr. Pearson is correct when he states that "all 
employees wanting to receive increased employment rights . . . would need to be 
terminated and then rehired . . . " Pearson's Response Brf., p. 10. Furthermore, his 
position that this is "unworkable" is not correct since it could be easily done at any time, 
including at the present time. 
C. MR. PEARSON WAS AT-WILL UNDER POST-2004 $ 10-3-1105. 
1. Mr. Pearson's Arguments Illustrate the Ambiguity. 
In attempting to show that post-2004 Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 is not 
ambiguous, Mr. Pearson's response brief actually shows the opposite. 
First, he contends the trial court was correct in finding that "deputy" and 
"assistant" are not ambiguous based on their definitions. See Pearson's Response Brf., 
pp. 13-15. Even if he were assumed to be correct he did not consider that these words 
may be categories and not meant as a specific title. For example, as the City's Assistant 
12 
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Police Chief, Mr. Pearson would fall within the category "deputy police chief because he 
was not just "'one who assists,'" and instead was "'someone not only who assists 
someone else, but who, with greater authority, may conduct the business of another.'" 
See id., p. 14 (quoting trial court's definitions). In light of this, the trial court's 
conclusion that Mr. Pearson was not at-will as Assistant Police Chief, was in error. 
Indeed, the simple fact that the terms reasonably could mean either of two things, a 
specific title or a category of employee, means the statute is ambiguous. 
Second, Mr. Pearson's argument regarding Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, that 
post-2004 § 10-3-1105 "clearly seeks to ensure that municipalities give their employees 
an adequate level of job security," is not the issue. See Pearson's Response Brf., pp. 15-
16. Even if it was, a comparable issue is what Mr. Pearson goes on to acknowledge, i.e., 
that "there are positions within municipalities where too much job security would be 
counterproductive." See id., p. 16. This is the City's point regarding its Assistant Police 
Chief, i.e., that position is second-in-command and stands in the place of the police chief 
when the police chief is unavailable. If the police chief is in a position where "too much 
job security would be counterproductive," this applies equally to the City's Assistant 
Police Chief and mirrors what the City argued in district court. 
2. Comparison with Other Statutes Also Illustrates the Ambiguity. 
Mr. Pearson disputes that ambiguity can be shown by comparing § 10-3-1105 with 
other statutes. However, his examples show otherwise. 
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First, he states post-2004 § 10-3-1105 would not eliminate a "marshal" as an at-
will employee because part (2)(g) would still apply because a marshal could be "a head of 
a municipal department." Interestingly, this is directly contrary to Mr. Pearson's position 
in trial court. In briefing and oral argument below, Mr. Pearson rejected the City's 
argument that (2)(g) is a "catch-all" provision such as he now suggests. His position 
there was that (2)(g) was intended to make allowances only for "new departments" that a 
municipality might create, "something that would not make it, for example, a police 
department." See R. 399; see also City's Init. Brf, Add., Ex. 2, pp. 22-23 (Hrg. Trans.). 
If Mr. Pearson's argument is accepted, the City's position likewise is correct that Mr. 
Pearson is at-will under part (2)(g) because he is "a deputy" to "a head of a municipal 
department." 
Second, Mr. Pearson addresses Ward v. Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). He contends Ward is inapplicable because: (1) Title 10 specifically notes that the 
terms "marshal" and "chief of police" are interchangeable (citing Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
918); and (2) this Court found in Ward that a police chief is "'clearly recognized as 
different than that of any other position in the police department for the obvious reason 
that the chief of police is in a position of making and carrying out policy for the mayor'" 
(quoting Ward, 776 P.2d at 97). However, in light of the fact that Ward predates the 
amendment at issue here, it is odd that the legislature would not include "marshal" along 
with "police chief if the statute intended that only specific titles were at-will. Further, if 
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making and carrying out policy is the applicable criterion, the City's Assistant Police 
Chief would be at-will because that was part of his position. SeeR. 179. Moreover, Mr. 
Pearson was also Chief of Police Operations, which would also apply to his argument 
concerning "marshal." SeeR. 111. 
Third, most of Mr. Pearson's discussion as to other statutes reflects his position 
that "assistant" is simply a "generic description." See, e.g., Pearson's Response Brf., p. 
19. This is exactly the City's point, i.e., that terms used in § 10-3-1105 should be applied 
as generic categories, and not as specific titles. 
Fourth, Mr. Pearson avoids the reality that both a "deputy police chief and 
"assistant police chief are at-will in cities of the first and second class with a civil 
service commission (see Utah Code Ann. $ 10-3-1002(1), whereas under his arguments 
only a "deputy police chief would be at-will in cities of the third, fourth, and fifth 
classes, as well as in cities of the first and second class without a civil service 
commission. See Pearson's Response Brf., p. 21. Instead, he argues this is an issue for 
the legislature to address, not the courts. Id. However, simply making that argument is 
an admission that post-2004 $ 10-3-1105 is inconsistent and ambiguous. 
Finally, Mr. Pearson suggests that "other relevant distinctions" in statutes involve 
the Utah Attorney General's Office, deputy district attorneys in counties, as well as South 
Jordan's deputy and assistant city managers. See Pearson's Response Brf., p. 22. Again, 
this only reinforces the fact of ambiguity in post-2004 Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. 
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D. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOES NOT SUPPORT MR. PEARSON'S 
POSITION. 
Mr. Pearson contends "legislative history supports the Trial Court's statutory 
interpretation and removes any argument that the Legislature's inclusion of 'Assistant 
Fire Chief was unintentional or insignificant," and that there is nothing in the legislative 
history to show "that the legislature intended the public to disregard their distinction 
between 'deputy' and 'assistant.'" Pearson's Response Brf., p. 22. This argument is 
unsupported by SB 23 fs legislative history. 
1. Legislative History is Sparse. 
Mr. Pearson argues that the legislative history of SB 23, which is the Bill that 
amended pre-2004 Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 & -1106, shows the legislature was 
"intentional and methodical in drafting the terms of the bill." Pearson's Response Brf., p. 
23. This is unsupported and perhaps questionable. The only legislative history available,8 
including the tape recordings of Committee hearings, shows the primary focus was § 10-
3-1106, and that little attention was paid to the terms at issue and especially to the unusual 
inclusion of "assistant fire chief but not "assistant police chief." 
a. Written Legislative History. 
First, the Senate floor debate of January 27, 2004, reflects that Senator Hatch 
stated that the process for the bill was started in 2003, that David Church, counsel for the 
8The Addendum to this Brief contains various written Minutes, including the 
sparse Minutes of the January 23, 2004 Committee hearing which is discussed below. 
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League of Cities and Towns, had put SB 23 together, and that Salt Lake City9 and Park 
City provided input. On January 28, 2004, Senator Hatch again spoke on the Senate 
floor, and stated the bill was based on the difficulty smaller municipalities had in 
complying with the then-requirement of the appeals board (five members-three to be 
chosen by and from appointive officers and employees, and two from members of the 
governing body). See City's Init. Brf, Add. at Ex. 1 (copy of pre-2004 Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1106(1)). At that point SB 23 was referred to the House. 
Second, House debates records show Representative Noel introduced SB 23 on 
February 11, 2004, by stating it allowed for different appeals boards in smaller cities, 
modified the process [of appeals], and required back salary [if the employee was 
reinstated]. Another Representative commented that it allowed for stronger action to 
release some employees. After a 66-0 vote, Representative Noel summarized that the bill 
would be returned to the Senate for further consideration. 
Third, on February 13, 2004, Senator Hatch again spoke about SB 23 on the floor. 
He moved not to concur with the proposed House amendments because of a line in the 
bill that had been included by Park City. The bill was referred back to the House. 
Significantly, Salt Lake City's Police Department has a civil service commission 
and is not even impacted by Utah Code Ann. $ 10-3-1105. Legislative history also 
reflects that Park City's only interest was the number of days of unpaid administrative 
leave that could be imposed on an employee before due process rights were implicated. 
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Fourth, on February 18, 2004, the House, through Representative Noel, moved to 
adopt the conference committee report, and that was adopted 69-0. Also on February 18, 
2004, Senator Hatch moved to adopt the conference committee report. The legislative 
history then comments that a different Senator had included an amendment proposed by 
Park City, which wished to clarify the length of unpaid administrative leave that could be 
imposed on an employee before due process rights became available [under $ 10-3-1106]. 
In short, based on the tapes of Senate and House debates on SB 23, nothing was 
said about police or fire departments. 
b. Tape Recordings of Committee Meetings. 
More information is available on tape recordings of meetings of the Senate 
Committee on Government Operations & Political Subdivisions ("Committee"), 
particularly the January 23, 2004 meeting.10 That tape, which is the only tape that may be 
relevant, begins with discussion of SB 91 (emergency medicine), then moves on to SB 23. 
At that January 23, 2004, meeting SB 23 was distributed to members, and Senator 
Hatch then commented that Salt Lake City had a concern about "involuntary transfer." 
David Church was present at the meeting, and commented that a couple of years 
previously, the Mayor of Escalante, Utah, had approached him with a concern about the 
composition of grievance boards because Escalante did not have sufficient employees to 
10Tapes can be reviewed at the Utah State Archives office, at 346 South Rio 
Grande, Salt Lake City, Utah. The City's counsel was told that calling ahead is preferable 
so that SB 23 tapes can by obtained by librarians prior to counsel's arrival. 
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make up the grievance board as required [by § 10-3-1106]. Mr. Church stated he had 
drafted SB 23, and that 6 10-3-1105 and 6 10-3-1106 had been a problem for years 
because those statutes did not fit the smaller municipalities. He stated police and fire 
department employees in larger cities had civil service protection, and that SB 23 added 
such protection for police and fire department employees in smaller cities. He also stated 
the smaller municipalities did not know what "superintendent" was intended to mean 
under the old language of $ 10-3-1105. "Superintendant," along with "heads of 
departments," was a category of employee that was at-will under that language. 
Significantly, Mr. Church then appeared11 to state—and this was very difficult to 
hear because of tape quality—that the amendment would clarify that the police chief and 
assistant police chief 'were not protected, nor would department heads be protected. He 
commented that the old language had led to a lot of litigation in the past. 
Continuing, Mr. Church stated the second concern was more important, in that the 
composition of the appeals board did not fit with Salt Lake City and Provo, which had a 
"strong mayor" government so that these two cities had to "work around" the present 
statute. He said, "what we've tried to do here is ensure that all employees entitled to due 
process still get due process but the due process hearing body would be established by 
nBecause of the poor tape-quality in the sense that the tape could not be amplified 
sufficiently to be able to hear with absolute clarity even though the tape was played 
repeatedly with the amplification as high as possible, counsel cannot say with 100% 
certainty that this was the term used. However, to counsel it sounded like "assistant 
police chief." 
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ordinance by each city. We think we're protecting more employees." Either Mr. Church 
or someone else also stated that Park City wanted an amendment to clarify that 
suspension without pay of fewer than three days would not entitle an employee to due 
process. 
c. Summary. 
The foregoing shows very little as to what SB 23 was intended to accomplish with 
regard to police departments and fire departments. It does, however, establish that 
retroactivity of the substantive portions of the statute was not discussed or anticipated. 
The only exception is if this Court were able to review the tape recording of the January 
23, 2004, Committee meeting and ascertain with certainty that "assistant police chief 
was the phrase used. That said, even that may not be determinative since Salt Lake 
City,12 which has a civil service commission, appeared to be in charge of drafting the bill 
and certainly would have had no interest in police departments, and also because SB 23 
was far more about § 10-3-1106 than § 10-3-1105. 
Further, if the intention was to resolve ambiguity and lack of clarity in pre-2004 § 
10-3-1105's use of the term "superintendant," the only logical explanation is that the 
12Salt Lake City uses the term "deputy" for those directly under its police chief, 
and unlike smaller communities in Utah, does have a civil sendee commission. Because 
it has a civil sendee commission, both an "assistant police chief and a "deputy police 
chief in the Salt Lake City Police Department would be at-will. There do not appear to 
be any "assistant police chiefs" in the Salt Lake City Police Department. 
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legislature intended Part 2(g) to be a generic catch-all provision, so that Mr. Pearson's 
employment as Assistant Police Chief was also within Part 2(g). 
E. MR. PEARSON5S JOB DESCRIPTION AND DUTIES ARE RELEVANT. 
Mr. Pearson contends that his job description and duties are irrelevant because he 
was not a "full deputy police chief and could not "stand in the Police Chiefs position." 
Pearson's Response Brf, pp. 25-27. However, the examples he gives undermine his 
statement. Indeed, Mr. Pearson recognized that he "assum[ed] total responsibility for the 
[police] department in the absence of the Public Safety Director," "assisted] in the 
development of department programs," and "provid[ed] general supervision to all 
department personnel, directly or through subordinate supervisors." See id. at pp. 26-27. 
F. MR. PEARSON ALSO WAS "A DEPUTY55 OF A "HEAD OF A 
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT.55 
Mr. Pearson argues that subsection 2(h) of post-2004 Utah Code Ann. $ 10-3-1105 
was created because "the Legislature cannot foresee what municipal departments may be 
created." Pearson's Response Brf., pp. 27-28. Since the Utah Legislature clearly knew 
when it enacted the amendment that some municipalities title their police chief as 
"marshal," this argument directly conflicts with Mr. Pearson's earlier argument that 
"marshal" falls in this category. See supra, discussion in Part 1(B)(2). 
The City's position is that subsection (h) is a generic catch-all provision that makes 
at-will any second-in-command in a municipal department that uses a different specific 
title. This is supported by Mr. Pearson's statement that "[w]ithout Subsection (h), a 
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City's decision to have a public safety department instead of a police department could 
have unintended employment implications that give a clear department head rights under 
the 2004 Amended Statute." Id. at p. 28. Significantly, the City did have a public safety 
department and its letterhead stationery at the time of Mr. Pearson's termination listed 
him as "Chief of Police Operations" in South Jordan's "Department of Public Safety." R. 
177. This in itself shows that Mr. Pearson's employment was at-will. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments in its initial appellate brief and in this reply brief, South 
Jordan City respectfully asks this Court to find that the district court erred in finding that 
Mr. Pearson was a merit employee under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. 
DATED this Q*^fay of May, 2011. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
&mille W- Johnson 
"Judith D. Wolferts 
Attorneys for South Jordan City 
1737957vl 
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LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL S.B. 23 
<L Approved for Filing: R.H. Rees <L 
& 12-23-03 7:23 AM & 
1 AMENDMENTS TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
2 2004 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
4 Sponsor: Thomas V. Hatch 
5 = = = = = = = = = ^ 
6 LONG TITLE 
7 General Description: 
8 This bill modifies provisions of the Utah Municipal Code relating to municipal officers 
9 and employees. 
10 Highlighted Provisions: 
11 This bill: 
12 • modifies the officers and employees of a municipality to whom certain provisions 
13 relating to the duration of employment and appeals from employment decisions 
14 apply; 
15 • modifies the composition of an appeal board for employment decisions; 
16 • modifies the process for appealing an action or decision of the appeal board; 
17 • expands circumstances covered by provisions relating to limitations on taking 
18 negative employment action; 
19 • requires rather than permits the appeal board to provide that an employee receive 
20 back salary if the board finds in favor of the employee; and 
21 • makes technical changes. 
22 Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
23 None 
24 Other Special Clauses: 
25 None 
26 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
27 AMENDS: 
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S.B. 23 12-23-03 7:23 AM 
28 10-3-1105, as enacted by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1977 
29 10-3-1106, as enacted by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1977 
30 = = = = = = = = ^ ^ 
31 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
32 Section 1. Section 10-3-1105 is amended to read: 
33 10-3-1105. Municipal employees — Duration and termination of employment — 
34 Exceptions. 
35 [All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members of the 
36 police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and superintendents,] 
37 (I) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold 
38 [their] employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge [or dismissal only as 
39 hereinafter provided.], suspension without pay, or transfer to a position with less remuneration 
40 only as provided in Section 10-3-1106. 
41 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
42 (a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive 
43 power in the municipality; 
44 (b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is a 
45 member of the classified civil service in a first or second class city; 
46 (c) a police chief of the municipality; 
47 (d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
48 (e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
49 (f) a deputy fire chief of the municipality; 
50 fg) a head of a municipal department; 
51 (h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department; 
52 (i) a superintendent; 
53 (\) a probationary employee of the municipality; or 
54 (TO a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
55 Section 2. Section 10-3-1106 is amended to read: 
56 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or transfer — Appeals — Board — 
57 Procedure. 
58 (1) [No officer or] An employee [covered by] to which Section 10-3-1105 [shall] 
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59 applies may not be discharged, suspended without pay, or transferred to a position with less 
60 remuneration; 
61 (a) because of [his] the employee's politics or religious belief[;]; or 
62 (b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or 
63 heads of departments. [In all cases where any officer or] 
64 (2) If an employee is discharged, suspended without pay, or transferred from one 
65 position to another for any reason, [he shall have the right to] the employee may appeal the 
66 discharge, suspension without pay, or transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board 
67 [which shall consist of five members, three of whom shall be chosen by and from the 
68 appointive officers and employees, and two of whom shall be members of the governing body]A 
69 established under Subsection (7\ 
70 [(2) The] (3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written 
71 notice of the appeal with the recorder within ten days after the discharge, suspension, or 
72 transfer. 
73 (b) ffl Upon the filing of [the] an appeal under Subsection (3)(V), the city recorder shall 
74 forthwith refer a copy of the [same] appeal to the appeal board. 
75 £ii} Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall 
76 forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidenceA and fully hear and determine 
77 the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge, suspension, or transfer. 
78 [(3) The] (4) An employee [shall be entitled to] who is the subject of the discharge. 
79 suspension, or transfer may: 
80 £a} appear in person and [to] be represented by counselfrto]; 
81 (b) have a public hearing[7to]; 
82 £c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered[;]; and [to] 
83 (d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
84 [(4) hi the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the officer or 
85 employee may have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing body whose decision shall be 
86 final, hi the event the appeal board docs not uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be 
87 closed and no further proceedings shall be had.] 
88 (5) [The] (a) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be 
89 certified to the recorder with 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it. [The boaid may, 
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90 in its decision,] 
91 fb) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that [an] the employee 
92 shall receive [his]: 
93 (\) the employee's salary for the period of time during which [he] the employee is 
94 discharged^] or suspended without pay; or 
95 £ii} any deficiency in salary for the period [he] during which the employee was 
96 transferred to a position of less remuneration [but not to exceed a 15 day period, hi no case 
97 shall the appointive officer or employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal is taken, 
98 except upon a concurrence of at least a majority7 of the membership of the governing body of 
99 the municipality]. 
100 [(G) In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge, or transfer, the 
101 recorder shall certify1 the decision to the employee affected, and also to the head of the 
102 department from whose order the appeal was taken. The employee shall be paid his salary, 
103 commencing with the next working day following the certification by the recorder of the appeal 
104 boai'd!s decision, provided that the employee, or officer, concerned reports for his assigned 
105 duties during that next working day.] 
106 (6) (a) An employee who is the subject of a final action or order of the appeal board 
107 may appeal the action or order to the Court of Appeals by filing with that court a notice of 
108 appeal. 
109 (b) Each notice of appeal under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the 
110 issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board. 
111 (c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the 
112 purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
113 (7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, [and] the 
114 number of members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting 
115 an appeal shall be prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by ordinance^ but the 
116 provisions for choosing the three members from the appointed officers and employees shall in 
117 no way restrict a free selection of members by the appointive officers and employees of the 
118 municipality]. 
119 fb) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a 
120 council-mayor form under Part 12, Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act an 
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121 ordinance adopted under Subsection (7Ya) may provide that the governing body of the 
122 municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
Legislative Review Note 
as of 12-2-03 3:31 PM 
A limited legal review of this legislation raises no obvious constitutional or statutory concerns. 
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel 
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MINUTES OF THE SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS & POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS 
STANDING COMMITTEE 
JANUARY 23,2004, 2:00 P.M. 
ROOM 403, STATE CAPITOL BUILDING 
Members Present: Sen. Carlene M. Walker, Chair 
Sen. Patrice Arent 
Sen. Dan Eastman 
Sen. Karen Hale 
Sen. Bill Hickman 
Sen. Peter Knudson 
Member Excused: Sen. Beverly Evans 
Staff Present: Richard North, Policy Analyst 
Saundra Maeser, Secretary 
Public Speakers Present: Jack Lucero, Asst. Chief, Weber Fire District 
Dale Zabriskie, Gold Cross Ambulance 
David Church, Attorney, Utah League of Cities and Towns 
Ray Walker, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
Chris Blake, Executive Director, Utah Republican Party 
A list of visitors and a copy of handouts are filed with the committee minutes. 
Committee Chair Walker called the meeting to order at2:25 p.m. 
1. Approval of Minutes 
MOTION: Sen. Arent moved to approve the minutes of the January 23, 2004 meeting. 
The motion passed unanimously with Sen. Eastman absent at the time of voting. 
2. S.B. 91 Emergency Medical Service Provider Amendments (S. Jenkins) 
Sen. Scott Jenkins introduced the bill, assisted by Jack Lucero, Asst. Chief, Weber Fire 
District. 
Dale Zabriskie, Gold Cross Ambulance, spoke in support of the bill. 
MOTION: Sen. Knudson moved to pass S.B. 91 out with a favorable recommendation. 
The motion passed unanimously. 
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2. S.B. 23 Amendments to Municipal Government (T. Hatch) 
Sen. Thomas Hatch introduced the bill, assisted by David Church, Attorney, Utah League of 
Cities and Towns. 
MOTION: Sen. Hickman moved to amend S.B. 23 as follows: 
1. Page 2, Lines 41 through 54: 
41 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
* * * Some lines not shown * * * 
49 (f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality: 
* * * Some lines not shown * * * 
53 (\) a probationary employee of the municipality: ff-oHl 
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or 
54 ff-fkHl (I) a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
2. Page 2, Line 58 through Page 3, Line 72: 
58 (1) [No officer or] An employee [covered by] to which Section 10-3-1105 [shaft] 
59 applies may not be discharged, suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to 
a position with less 
60 remuneration! 
* * * Some lines not shown * * * 
64 £2} fa) If an employee is discharged, suspended without pay, or 
involuntarily transferred from one 
65 position to another for any reason, [he shall have the right to] the employee may ^ 
subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the 
66 discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to be known as 
the appeal board 
67 [which shall consist of five members, three of whom shall be chosen by and from the 
68 appointive officers and employees, and two of whom shall be members of the governing 
body]A 
69 established under Subsection (7). 
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the 
employee shall exhaust the emploveefs rights under that grievance procedure before 
appealing to the board. 
70 [(2) The] (3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written 
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71 notice of the appeal with the recorder within ten days after ^ 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee 
receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance 
procedure: or 
(10 if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the 
discharge, suspension, or involuntary 
72 transfer. 
3. Page 3, Line 88 through Page 4, Line 90: 
88 (5) HFhel (a) fi) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and 
shall be 
89 certified to the recorder [[ with ]] within 15 days from the date the matter is 
referred to it , except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii) . [The board may, 
90 in its decision,] 
(ii) For good cause* the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent. 
4. Page 4, Lines 106 through 108: 
106 (6) (a) \\ An employee who is the subject of a ]] A final action or order of 
the appeal board 
107 may [[ appeal the action or order-]] be appealed to the Court of Appeals by 
filing with that court a notice of 
108 appeal. 
The motion passed unanimously. 
MOTION: Sen. Hale moved to pass S.B. 23, as amended, out with a favorable 
recommendation. 
The motion passed unanimously. 
3. S.B. 113 Administrative Procedures Act Amendments (L. Hillyard) 
Sen. Sen. Hickman introduced the bill in place of Sen. Lyle Hillyard. Ray Walker, DOPL, 
assisted in the presentation. 
MOTION: Sen. Arent moved to pass S.B. 113 out with a favorable recommendation. 
The motion passed unanimously. 
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4. S.B. 97 Certification Deadline for Political Parties (C. Bramble) 
Sen. Bramble introduced the bill, assisted by Chris Blake, Executive Director of the Utah 
Republican Party. 
MOTION: Sen. Eastman moved to pass S.B. 97 out with a favorable recommendation. 
The motion passed unanimously. 
MOTION: Sen. Hickman moved to adjourn. 
The motion passed unanimously. 
Committee Chair Walker adjourned the meeting at 2:55 p.m. 
Minutes reported by Saundra Maeser, Secretary. 
Sen. Carlene Walker, Committee Chair 
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